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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we develop a model to examine the impact of an individual’s economic and social 
orientation and the congruence of such orientations across the trustor-trusted dyad on the level of 
dyadic trust within a team.  The model explicitly accounts for higher order dependencies in trust 
among team members and the potential reciprocity in trust between members of a dyad.  The 
results from our model estimation provide evidence that congruence in economic and social 
orientation is an important antecedent of dyadic trust.  We also find that dyadic trust is 
characterized by higher order dependencies among team members; however, we do not find that 
trust is characterized by reciprocity.  We also find a wide variation in the polarization in teams 
based on the levels of trust among their members.  Taken together, these findings highlight the 
need to account for higher order dependencies in the study of trust in teams.  
 
Keywords:  trust within teams; organizational team analysis; bilinear network model; economic and social 
orientation; team polarization 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
rust is widely acknowledged as an important antecedent of cooperative behavior both within and 
across organizations because it is one of the forces that bind individuals together in a team as they 
strive to achieve common goals (Axelrod 1984).  It is believed to promote efficient communication 
and coordination within a team, facilitate the management of slack among team members, focus energy away from 
issues unrelated to performance, and consequently help improve the quality of collaborative outcomes (Larson and 
LaFasto 1989).  The study of the antecedents and consequences of trust and among members of teams and 
organizations has therefore remained an important area of research in the social sciences (Gambetta 1988; Good 
1988; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; McAllister 1995).   
 
One stream of literature on trust focuses on its economic underpinnings and explores the concept within the 
context of risk-taking in decision-making (Granovetter 1985, Williamson 1993).  A central thrust of research within 
this domain is the examination of how trust influences an actor‟s subjective beliefs about the probability of future 
favorable or unfavorable behavior by counter-party in a relationship (Gideon 2007).  In a parallel stream of work, 
however, trust is conceptualized as a social construct that results from long-standing interpersonal relationships 
(Lewis and Weigart 1985).  In a specific set of circumstances, the relative effects of economic and social factors on 
trust are, of course, expected to be influenced by an individual‟s own propensity to trust (Good 1988) as well as 
contextual variables such as the trustor‟s mood (McAllister 1995). 
 
Taken together, these streams of research suggest that the level of trust across a trustor-trusted dyad may be 
influenced by both economic and social factors.  Economic factors tend to be forward looking and incorporate 
expectations of likely future behavior by others.  Social factor, on the other hand, tend to be anchored in past 
relationships and are based on the depth of interpersonal bonds between the trustor and the trusted (Jones and 
George 1998).  However, several questions regarding the effects of these two factors remain unaddressed.  First, we 
do not know whether the trustor‟s economic or social orientation towards the trusted is a stronger driver of dyadic 
trust.  Second, it is unclear whether a high level of overall trust in one direction across a dyad in any way influences 
the level of trust in the reciprocal direction.   
T 
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These questions become more complex when we consider trust in dyadic relationships that are formed 
within the context of larger teams or organizational systems.  In a team environment, the relationship between a 
trustor and trusted is likely to be influenced by higher order team dynamics and the relationships of the members of 
a dyad with the remaining team members.  In other words, dyadic trust is likely to be influenced by whether other 
team members trust one or both members of the focal dyad as well as the overall level of polarization in the levels of 
trust within the team.   However, while the relative importance of economic versus social orientation, higher order 
team dependencies, and the polarization of the team are key issues to the study of dyadic trust within teams, their 
complete resolution has been constrained, in part, because of an absence of an appropriate methodology.  
 
In this paper, we develop a model to examine the impact of an individual‟s economic and social orientation 
and the congruence of such orientations across the trustor-trusted dyad on the level of dyadic trust in a team.   The 
proposed model has several novel features.  First, it explicitly accounts for higher order dependencies in trust among 
team members and then examines their effects on the level of trust at a dyadic level.  In other words, it accounts for 
the influence of the relationships between the trustor and other members of the team on the level of trust on a focal 
trusted. Specifically, it allows us to examine the common trustor effect, that is, the effect that the levels of trust by a 
third team member on the individual members of a dyad has on the levels of trust between the two members.  It also 
allows us to examine a common trusted effect, that is, the effect that the levels of trust of the members of a dyad on 
a third team member has on the level of trust between them.  Second, the model incorporates the effects of both 
individual-specific economic and social orientation as well as the congruence of such orientations between the 
trustor and the trusted.  Therefore, it allows us to examine whether the trustor‟s own orientation or a match between 
the orientations of the trustor and the trusted influences the level of trust between them.  And, third, the model 
allows us to examine reciprocity in trust and assess whether the extent to which one team member trusts a second 
member is in any way related to the extent to which the second team member trusts the first one.   
 
The results from the estimation of our model using data on dyadic trust from executives working in teams 
provide evidence for the existence of higher order dependencies among the levels of trust in teams.  Specifically, we 
find evidence in support of the common trustor effect which suggests that a higher order dependency exists in the 
levels of trust between two members who are evaluated similarly by the same external trustor. We also find that both 
economic and social orientation may be important antecedents of dyadic trust in a team.  In our sample, we find that 
the congruence of economic goals had a greater effect on mutual trust than the congruence of social goals.  
However, we do not find individual orientation to have significant effect on the levels of trust.  Nor do we find trust 
levels to be characterized by reciprocity in that a higher level of trust by one team member translating into a high 
level of trust in the reverse direction.  Nevertheless, we do find evidence for a wide variation in the polarization of 
teams based on the levels of trust among its members.  While some teams were balanced with similar levels of trust 
across the members, others were highly polarized with significant imbalances in levels of trust.  Taken together, 
these findings highlight the need to account for higher order dependencies in the study of trust in teams and provide 
a new methodological approach to address such dependencies.   
 
Our goal in this paper is to make two contributions to the literature on trust within teams.  First, we 
introduce a modeling approach that is capable of examining the effects of social and economic orientation and the 
congruence therein on dyadic trust in teams after accounting for higher-order dependencies in trust among team 
members. And second, we develop a mechanism to uncover the extent of polarization in trust within a team based on 
the level of trust variation among team members. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the relationship between our 
research and the extant body of literature on trust in teams.  Thereafter, we develop our model and discuss its key 
features.  Following that, we describe our study and discuss our key findings pertaining to both the antecedents of 
dyadic trust and the levels of polarization in teams. We conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of our 
work and proposing some directions for future research. 
  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LITERATURE 
 
While trust is most frequently defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of others (Rousseau 
et al. 1998), multiple definitions of the construct co-exist in the social sciences (Barber 1983; Luhmann 1979; Mayer 
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et al. 1995).  In the organizational behavior literature in particular, trust has been conceptualized in a several distinct 
ways.  At one end of the spectrum, the emphasis is more on its strategic and calculative dimensions (Burt and Knez 
1995).  Under this conceptualization, trust is thought of as an element of cooperative behavior that is used to 
communicate expectations in games where individuals can carry out threats or promises (Lewis and Weigert 1985).  
At the other end of the spectrum are definitions that highlight the social and ethical factors that underlie trust 
(Hosmer 1995). 
 
While researchers acknowledge that there in no universally accepted definition of the construct (Rousseau 
et al.1998) most agree that trust is a multidimensional psychological state (Kramer 1999).  It has both cognitive and 
affective dimensions that may be present to different degrees depending on the contextual characteristics of the 
situation (McAlister 1995).  These two dimensions relate to the economic and social roots of trust.  The former 
captures the expectations of good faith efforts that others will undertake to honor their commitments and not take 
advantage of the counterparty when the opportunity arises (Hosmer 1995).  The latter captures the strength of 
interpersonal social bonds and represents a collective property of members of a social system (Lewis and Weigart 
1985). 
 
Trust in Teams 
 
While trust is sometimes conceptualized as an individual disposition or a trait, it is generally suggested that 
it is principally an aspect of a dyadic relationship and may consequently vary within a person across his or her 
relationships (Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis 2007).  Importantly, in many organizational settings, these dyads are 
themselves embedded inside larger teams or similar social systems.  These teams rely on interdependencies among 
their members in order to achieve individual and team goals (Wilson, Straus, and McEvily 2006).  And, when 
members are not able to fully monitor each other‟s behavior because of a lack of complete transparency into their 
actions, they tend to rely on trust in order to ensure an effective functioning of the team (Sheppard and Sherman 
1998).  An absence of trust can therefore have several adverse consequences, such as a loss of productivity 
(McAlister 1995), lack of communication (Zucker et al. 1996), and dissatisfaction among team members 
(Golembiewski and McKonkie 1975).    
 
However, despite the importance of trust in determining the performance and effectiveness of teams (Jones 
and George 1998), research is scarce on the determinants of trust in groups.  This may be not altogether surprising 
because a team involves several members, and the interdependencies among them make trust within teams a 
relatively complex phenomenon (Ashleigh and Nandhakumar 2007).  While these dependencies increase the 
importance of trust as an antecedent for effective team functioning, they also increase the methodological challenges 
to the study of trust in teams.  Specifically, in a team setting, it is often not possible to reduce interpersonal trust to 
either individual trait or even a characteristic of a dyadic relationship.  Instead, because several dyads are embedded 
within a larger group, trust is likely to also depend on group characteristics such as the degree to which the members 
of a team come together for a common economic purpose (Zand 1972) or the intensity of the social ties that bind 
them (Weigart 1981).  Therefore interpersonal trust in groups is likely to be a function of both the homogeneity of 
the group and their social connectedness as well as their common objectives and goals. The relative strength of these 
two antecedents of trust may, of course, depend on the nature and strength of the social relationships as well as the 
specific economic incentives present in the context (Bonoma 1976).    
 
Economic Orientation 
 
Real economic actors tend to engage not only in the pursuit of self-interest but also in “opportunism” 
(Williamson, 1975).  The economic underpinnings of trust are therefore tied to its conceptualization as a cognitive 
process where one makes a rational evaluation of the likely behavior of others in order to assess the risk associated 
with achieving a self-interest or economic goal.  They reflect the confidence of one party or actor to rely on a partner 
in a purposeful exchange relationship (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman, 1993) and the belief that actions by a 
partner that will result in positive outcomes (Anderson and Narus, 1990).  Economists suggest that some level of 
trust in such relationships is necessary for pursuing common goals because mere institutional arrangements are often 
not sufficient to prevent abuse or fraud (Granovetter, 1985).  They argue for the role of personal relations and 
structures in networks that discourage unwarranted behavior.   
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Social Orientation 
 
Relatively recent research suggests that trust also has social underpinnings in addition to economic 
considerations (Haas and Deseran, 1981).  In this stream of work, the construct is conceptualized as a characteristic 
of social systems that consist of dyads or groups rather than an individual psychological state.  It is argued that the 
need for trust surfaces only when we have interactions or relationships among individuals and that trust therefore 
rests on an interpersonal or social basis (Lewis and Weigart, 1985).  It is built, in part, on the strength of the 
emotional bonds that result from social interactions among actors and may be motivated in part by the affect for the 
trusted. 
 
The social bonds that accompany trust ultimately help teams achieve superior performance (Jarvenpaa and 
Leidner, 1998) and constitute an important source of social capital within people systems.  Within an organizational 
setting in particular, trust helps reduce transaction costs, increase spontaneous sociability among team members, and 
facilitate appropriate forms of respect to organizational authorities (Kramer, 1999).  However, because these social 
bonds do not form instantaneously, trust is not immediately inherent at the beginning of a social encounter.  Instead, 
it builds up over time as team members are able share feelings and thoughts and build exchange relationships in 
which they reflect others as trustworthy parties (Jones and George, 1998).  Over time, they develop positive 
affective responses towards other team members that increase the strength emotional bonds among them (Dunn and 
Schweitzer, 2005, Weber, Malhotra, and Murningham, 2005).  
 
Reciprocity and Higher Order Dependencies 
 
One of the key issues in the literature on trust is whether the construct exhibits reciprocity.  However, the 
notion of reciprocity can be conceptualized in at least two ways.  There can be reciprocity in behavior where a 
person who is the beneficiary of positive behavior by another subsequently engages in actions that are beneficial to 
the former (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006, and Song, 2009).  On the other hand, there could be reciprocity in the levels 
of trust itself where a high level of trust by a trustor results in a high level of trust in the reciprocal direction by the 
trusted.  While the second issue remains important, much of the research on trust has been on investigating it as a 
unidirectional construct with little emphasis on trust reciprocity (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007).   
 
Further, because dyads are themselves embedded in larger multi-person teams, in addition to reciprocity, 
we need to also incorporate the effects of other higher order team dynamics in order to understand the antecedents of 
trust.  Specifically, we need to account for transitivity which might result from implicit influences from other team 
members on a dyad.  The presence of transitivity in trusting relationships would mean that if a member i has a high 
trust level on member j and member j has high trust level on member k, then member i should have high trust on 
member k. Such dependencies among group members are the building blocks of the trust equilibrium in a team. In 
addition, we expect balance to play a role in the level of trust in a team.  Balance implies that the trust between 
member i and member j is based on how the remaining other team members perceive member j
1
. 
 
In summary, we expect that individual economic and social orientation and the congruence of orientations 
across the dyad will affect the level of interpersonal trust in teams.  Trust is also likely to be characterized by 
reciprocity in that if a trustor has a high level of trust in the trusted then the reciprocal relationship is also likely to be 
true.  And finally, we expect that the level of trust at a dyadic level will be influenced by higher order dependencies 
across members of the teams.  Our proposed model attempts to account for all these factors as potential antecedents 
of trust. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The key construct in our investigation is the level of dyadic trust between one team member (or trustor i) 
and another member (or trusted j) from the same team. The set of these measures of this construct can be represented 
in the form of a socio-matrix Y= yij where yij represents the level of dyadic trust y between trustor i and trusted j. 
Because our goal is to also account for a team member‟s individual orientation and the impact of team dynamics on 
                                                 
1 Please see Hoff (2005) and Wassermann and Faust (1994) for more details on second order and third order dependencies.  
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dyadic trust, our model needs to have certain features.  First, it needs to account for the effects of individual 
members‟ own characteristics that may impact their trust evaluation of other team members. And second, it needs to 
be flexible enough to control for and estimate higher order group dynamics.  Therefore, we considered a bilinear 
mixed-effects model of trust that incorporates these requirements (Hoff, 2005, and Hoff and Ward, 2004). We later 
compare this model with a benchmark linear trust model that is traditionally used to model similar data structures 
(Barrera 2007, and Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman, 1993).   
 
We begin with a linear model of trust where the effects of dyadic covariates xij (social and economic 
congruence) on dyadic trust yij between trustor i and trusted j can be represented as follows: 
 
, , ,i j i j i jy x     (1) 
 
Because the effects of individual member‟s traits and higher order group dynamics are captured in the error 
component of this linear model, the model assumes to have a covariance structure that is exchangeable under 
identical permutations of the indices i, j of the two members, respectively.  In other words, the trust of member i on 
member j is considered distinct from the trust of member j on member i (i.e. yi,j and i, j are different from yj,i  and j, 
i). Therefore, we represent the joint distribution of i, j’s as a random-effects component of the residual and regard ɛi,j 
in equation 1 as  
 
, ,i j i j i ja b              (2) 
 
where ai represents the effect of individual characteristics of trustor i, bj represents the effect of individual 
characteristics of trusted j and (ai, bj)′ ~ multivariate normal [MVN] (0,Ʃab).  
 
Therefore, 
 
2
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We also consider , ,(    ) ~ (0, )i j j i MVN     . Therefore, 
 
2 2
,
2 2
,
0
~ ,
0
i j
j i
N
 
 
  
  
     
            
 
 
Therefore, the covariance structure of the error term is: 
 
2 2 2 2
,( ) 2i j a ab bE              
2
, ,( ) 2i j j i abE         
, ,( ) 0i j k lE         
2
, ,( )i j i k aE       
2
, ,( )i j k j bE       , ,( )i j k i abE    , 
where 
2
a  represent the variance in the observation due to the trust measured by the same trustor.  
2
b  represents 
the variance in the observation due to the trust measured by the different trustor on the same trusted, and ρ 
represents the correlation of observations between a particular pair of members and serves as a measure of 
reciprocity in group behavior. Thus, 
 
, ,i j i j i ja b              (3) 
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The above equation (3) is modeled as a Gaussian
2
 such that the dyadic data are unconditionally dependent, 
but conditionally independent because of the given the random effects of the trustor and the trusted members. 
Therefore,  
 
 , , ,( | ) ( )i j i j i jE y g  , and 
 
 12 13 , 1 12 13 , 1 , ,( , ,... | , ,... ) ( | )n n n n i j i j
i j
p y y y p y    

   
 
Incorporating the Effects of Higher-order Dependence 
 
Higher order dependencies among members are present and often prominent in most team activities 
(Wassermann and Faust, 1994). For example, strong dyadic trust between two team members can impact their trust 
over others. Similarly, strong explicit opinion by a key member about a particular other member, say A, can also 
impact the way other team members perceive A.  
 
To capture the effects of such dependencies in our trust model, we construct a latent K-dimensional vector 
zi and zj for each trustor and trusted respectively and add the inner product z′izj to the error model Equation 2.  
 
Thus, 
 
, ,i j i j i j i ja b z z                (4) 
 
Based on the magnitude and direction of the latent vectors, the inner product i jz z  captures different 
higher-order dependence through the expectation of the higher order moment. Further, the incorporation of i jz z  
into the linear predictor allows for additional moments of ɛi,j. Therefore, 
 
2 2 2 2 4
,( )i j a b zE K         
 
2 4
, ,( ) 2i j j i ab zE K        
 
6
, ,( )i j k l zE K    
 
Because the inner-product term i jz z   is a fixed effect, it can be considered as a reduced-rank interaction 
term. This is typically known as the bilinear effect or multiplicative interaction (Hoff, 2005). To include this inner 
product of the member‟s latent characteristics in the random effect model, Equation (3) is re-parameterized as: 
 
, , , ,
,
,
i j d d i j i j i j i j
i tor tor i i
j ted ted j j
x tor ted z z
tor x a
ted x b
  


     
 
 
          (5) 
 
where xd,i,j are dyadic covariates specific to a dyad i-j, that is, the level of congruence in the economic and social 
                                                 
2 In our case, a Gaussian model is appropriate, given that we compute the trust level of the trustor i on trusted member j as an 
average score of four scale items in the questionnaire  
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orientation of trustor i and trusted j respectively, xtor,i are the trustor specific covariates, that is,  an individual 
trustor‟s social and economic orientation, and xted,j are the trusted specific covariates, that is, an individual trusted‟s 
social and economic orientation. 
 
In other words, the final trust model estimated to determine the effects of economic and social congruencies 
and individual traits on dyadic trust is as follows: 
 
, , , , , ,i j d d i j tor tor i i ted ted j j i j i jy x x a x b z z                       (6) 
 
This model controls for higher order team dynamics using the bilinear component i jz z and also allows 
both trustor (xtor,i ) and trusted (xted,j ) characteristics to be investigated along with the dyadic covariates (xd,i,j). 
 
Data 
 
We tested our proposed model using data collected from participants in a two-year executive MBA 
program.  These participants had a minimum of five years of work experience and were organized into twenty 
permanent teams of five members each to work on their course projects for the entire first year of the program.  We 
chose this sample for estimating our model for several reasons.  First, all the teams were constituted at the same time 
and had worked together for the same duration at the time of the study.  Second, they were on campus on the same 
days and had similar opportunities to develop social ties.  Third, all teams were part of a lock-step program, were 
required to undertake similar team-based projects, and had similar team level performance goals.  And finally, they 
were in an environment where there was frequent feedback available on their performance which allowed them to 
periodically assess how their team was performing on the tasks for which it was constituted.   
 
A survey instrument was developed that contained items on social orientation, economic orientation, and 
overall trust that were each measured using a 1-7 agree-disagree scale.  Each member of a team rated every other 
member of his or her team on these variables.  We measured trust using six items that covered whether a team 
member thought carefully before sharing information, entered into unwritten contracts, minimized information 
exchange, checked on each other through third parties, stated obligations clearly, and looked over their shoulder.  
We measure economic orientation using nine items that covered whether the relationship with the team member 
helped achieve professional and academic goals.  On the other hand, we measured social orientation using eleven 
items that covered whether the relationship with the team member helped achieve social and friendship related 
goals.  The data were collected midway through the course of the second half of the academic year. 
 
Model Estimation 
 
We used a Bayesian process to estimate the parameters of the model shown in Equation 5.  Specifically, we 
employed a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to sample values of the trustor and trusted specific 
parameters from their posterior distributions. The estimation process constructs a Markov chain in 
2{ , , , , , , }d tor ted ab zZ       and follows a three-step process of sampling from the desired trusted posterior 
distribution
2( , , , , , | )tor ted ab Zp Z Y    . The details of the estimation process are shown in Appendix A. To 
facilitate the estimation process, we used the „gbme‟ function written in R developed by Hoff (2005).  We finally 
used two latent dimensions in our analysis after testing for other number of latent dimensions.
3
 
 
RESULTS 
 
We ran the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm as shown in Appendix A on our dyadic trust data. Each 
                                                 
3 Five different values of K=0 to K=4 were tested with a four-fold cross-validation procedure as described by Hoff (2005) in his 
seminal paper. The predictive performances for all the K values were roughly the same. The biggest improvement in the marginal 
likelihood criterion was found to be from K=1 to K=2. Therefore, K=2 was selected. 
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chain was run for 200,000 iterations.  Note that our model involves a large number of parameters, including trustor 
and trusted specific covariates, and terms capturing higher order dependencies.  Therefore, following the suggestion 
of MacEachern and Berliner (1994), we stored every 50
th
 iteration in order to keep the output file to a reasonable 
size.  Outputs from the first 20,000 iterations were considered burn-in and were not recorded.   
 
The posterior mean values of the coefficients and the standard errors of the covariates from the model 
estimation are reported in Table 1.  We find that the level of trust by a trustor on a trusted was significantly 
influenced by the congruence of both their economic and social orientations (p < 0.05 for both).  The coefficient for 
economic congruency (0.52) is larger than that for social congruency (0.38), suggesting that similar economic goals 
were perhaps more important among members of our sample than similar social goals.  However, we find that the 
coefficients for the individual orientation of both the trustor and the trusted are not statistically significant (p > 0.10).  
This suggests that the matching between the orientations of the members of the dyad was more influential in driving 
trust than either a high or a low level of individual economic or social orientation of the respective members of each 
dyad. 
 
Impact of Higher Order Dependencies  
 
Recall that we are also interested in determining the impact of higher order dependencies among team 
members on the level of dyadic trust between them.  The results reported in Table 1 show significant common 
trustor variance which suggests that higher order dependency in trust existed between members of a dyad who were 
trusted similarly by a third outside trustor.  In other words, if two members were highly trusted by a third member, 
then the trust between the two members was also high.  However, we did not find any significant effect of a 
common trusted in our study.  Importantly, we found the variance of the latent dimensions to be small and similar to 
that of the errors of the model, suggesting that our model is well calibrated and has captured the higher-order effects 
of team dynamics on dyadic trust. Finally, the coefficient for reciprocity was positive but not statistically significant 
(p > 0.10).  This is a key finding which shows that a high level of trust by one team member, i, on another member, 
j, did not translate into a high level of trust in a reciprocal direction by j on i. In other words, only a small degree of 
within-dyad dependence was present among the team members. 
 
 
Table 1:  Posterior Means and Standard Deviation of Covariates in Bilinear Mixed-effect Trust Model 
** Significant at 95% CI 
    † Significantly different from 0 at 95% CI 
 
 
Comparison with A Benchmark Model 
 
We next compare the findings of our bilinear mixed-effects model with a benchmark linear trust model
4
 of 
                                                 
4 We also considered a mixed benchmark model where individual social and economic traits of members are used as covariates 
along with the congruency measures along with random components to control for individual members average social and 
economic assessments. Although the directions of effects are found to be similar to the one shown in Table 1, none of them are 
found to be statistically significant. The results can be obtained from the authors.  
Covariates Coefficients (Std. Dev) 
Economic Congruency Between Trustor (member i) and Trusted (member j) 0.5190**  (0.1569) 
Social Congruency Between  Trustor (member i) and  Trusted (member j) 0.3800**  (0.0180) 
Economic Intent of  Trustor (member i) 0.0010  (0.0046) 
Economic Intent of  Trusted (member j) -0.0062  (0.0046) 
Social Intent of  Trustor (member i) -0.0072  (0.0048) 
Social Intent of  Trusted (member j) -0.0063  (0.0046) 
Reciprocity 0.0087  (0.0193) 
Error Variance 0.0503†  (0.0010) 
Common Trustor Variance 0.002†   (0.0004) 
Common Trusted Variance 0.00000  (0.0001) 
Variance of Latent Dimensions 0.0554†  (0.0159) 
Variance of Inner Dimensions 0.0624†   (0.0167) 
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the following form.  
 
1 20 1 2p p p
y x x                  (7) 
 
In this benchmark model, we consider each dyadic trust (of pair p) evaluation yp as an independent event 
and estimate the effect of the economic (
1p
x ) and social congruencies (
2p
x ) between the respective team members 
using a linear model. The results from the estimation of this benchmark linear model are reported in Table 2. 
Comparing the fit of these two models, we find that the negative log likelihood of the benchmark model is 
substantially inferior (−241.63) than our proposed bilinear mixed-effects model (-3887.33).  The superior fit of our 
model suggests the presence of higher-order group dynamics in such team activities and the importance of 
controlling for them during the analysis of dyadic trust.  Further, we find that, in the benchmark model, while the 
coefficients of both the economic congruency (0.063) and social congruency (0.015) are positive, neither one is 
statistically significant (p > 0.10)
5
.  In other words, not only did the benchmark model fit relatively poorly compared 
to the proposed model, it also failed to appropriately identify some of the key antecedents of dyadic trust. 
 
 
Table 2:  Competing Model Parameter Coefficients 
** Significant at 95% CI 
 
 
TEAM POLARIZATION 
 
Given the empirical evidence on the significant effect of higher-order dependencies on dyadic trust in 
teams, we next examine the team dynamics based on the social polarization among their respective members. 
Polarization or the trust variation among team members is one of the most visible outcomes of higher order 
dependencies. It results from a sense of „„us versus them‟‟ between subgroups within teams which is typically 
caused due to imbalance in trust among team members (Munkvold and Zigurs, 2007). Teams can be balanced where 
the dyadic trust level is equal across all member pairs, or they can be polarized, where there is an inequality in the 
levels of dyadic trust among the members.  The latter situation can potentially lead to conflicts and goal 
displacements among team members, ultimately resulting in undesirable performance outcomes.  
 
We examine trust imbalance within teams in our sample in two steps. In the first step, we compute each 
member‟s location in a latent space characterized by their trust levels in their teams. From this step, we are not only 
be able to identify different team structures based on the dyadic trusts among the members, but are also be able to 
identify similar and different teams based on the trust variation among the team members. In the second step, we 
take the structure of individual teams and micro-analyze their polarization.  
 
In order to estimate the location of each team, we adapt a latent class hierarchical model (Handcock et al., 
2007) to evaluate the latent positions of the team members based on their trust assessments.  Because we intend to 
examine team polarization based on level of dyadic trust (high trust and low trust), we recomputed the trust measure 
as binary with 1 if it was above 4 on the 7-point scale (1-7) and 0, if it was below 4
6
. In this modeling approach, we 
represent the variation in trust across the members in a latent space, denoted by Zk where k is equal to the number of 
latent dimensions. The data matrix Y = [yij] is viewed as a random variable in a sample space of
( 1)
,{0,max( )}
n n
i jY y
  and the probability function to estimate the zi and zj in the latent space is given by: 
                                                 
5 We also performed robustness check for multicollinearity. Both Variance Inflation Factor (<=1.73) and Condition Index 
(<=11.54) suggest absence of multicollinearity. 
6 Current limitation of the newly developed latent class hierarchical model (Handcock et al. 2007) of only allowing binary 
network structures as input also contributed to this decision. 
Covariates Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Intercept 4.3412 (0.2628)** 
Economic Congruency 0.0628 (0.0618) 
Social Congruency 0.0121 (0.0672) 
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0 ,Pr( | , ) Pr( | , , )i j i j
i j
Y y Z y z z 

    (8) 
Using a Poisson likelihood function and two latent dimensions
7
, we estimate the above equation 8 using 
MCMC routines found in latentnet function (Krivitsky and Handcock, 2008).   
 
RESULTS 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a plot of different teams in the two-dimensional latent space. The clusters represent the 
location of the teams, and the extent of dispersion within each cluster represents the polarization in trust among the 
members of each team. This plot shows two interesting team characteristics of our study sample. First, it 
demonstrates that the teams differed significantly from one another based on the level of mutual trust among their 
members.  And second, it illustrates three types of polarization structure among teams which we term as a highly 
polarized environment, where two members are tied at opposite edges of the central member cluster (Team A in 
Figure 1), semi-polarized environment, where only one member is outside the clusters of other members (Team B in 
Figure 1) and a balanced environment, where all members are clustered together indicating a non-polarized state 
(Team C in Figure 1).   
 
In order to examine each of these three team structures in details, we plot them (Figure 2) using 
Fruchterman-Reingold (1991) 2-D layout algorithm where the team is represented as a network with the team 
members as nodes and their connection to one another is based on the level of dyadic trust between them. The first 
figure (Figure 2a), from Team A, shows a type of highly polarized team where more than one team member is 
located far from others. In this case, we find that the members of Team A, whom we name Paul, Ringo, and Pete, 
have similar dyadic trust among them.  However, there is a trust imbalance between them and two other members, 
whom we name John and George with high trust inequality between John and George. Such a structure indicates a 
state of disequilibrium and a low proportion of reciprocity among team members.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Structural Plots of the Groups 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7As k=2 was used in the previous analysis.  See Handcock et al. (2007) for detailed information regarding the estimation of the 
model.  
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Figure 2a:  Team-A Highly-Polarized Team 
 
 
Figure 2b:  Team-B Semi-Polarized Team 
 
Figure 2c:  Team-C Balanced Team 
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The next team structure (Figure 2b) of Team B illustrates another type of team polarization, which we label 
as a semi-polarized team. In this case only one team member is in disequilibrium.  This member, whom we call 
Gato, is located far from a closely connected group of members, whom we call Jeffe, Muy, Trabajo, and Perro.  
This suggests that there is a high variance between the level of Gato’s trust of others and others‟ trust of him. 
Finally, the third figure (Figure 2c) illustrates a balanced team where every member of the team (Team C) is close to 
each other, suggesting similar levels of dyadic trust among them. Such a structure further indicates high proportion 
of reciprocity, strong bond, and greater cooperation among the team members.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Organizations strive to understand the drivers of trust among members of teams in order to build high 
performance teams.  Therefore, it is imperative for them to understand the drivers of trust among team members.  
However, the examination of interpersonal trust in a team setting is constrained in part because of a lack of 
appropriate methodologies to investigate this complex phenomenon.  In this paper, we develop and estimate a model 
of dyadic trust in teams in a system consisting of multiple teams.  As the scope of our findings suggests, the 
proposed modeling approach has several advantages over more traditional methods to investigate the antecedents of 
dyadic trust.  It allows us to capture the direct effects of multiple facets of individual orientations such as those 
pertaining to economic incentives and social relationships.  It also allows us to estimate the effects of these 
individual orientations in a many-to-many context where multi-person teams lead to several, inter-related, bi-
directional, dyadic relationships.  Our model is able to account for higher order dependencies across team members 
that are likely to be present in such contexts.  Consequently, the results from the estimation of our model do perhaps 
provide a better explanation for the variation in trust across the system and unearth antecedents of trust that were 
otherwise found to be not statistically significant using a more traditional linear modeling approach.  Finally, our 
integrated modeling approach also enables us to examine reciprocity of trust in dyadic relationships that is difficult 
using conventional approaches. 
 
From a substantive point of view, our study shows that, while individual levels of social or economic 
orientation may not be significant drivers of trust, the congruence of orientations between the trustor and trusted 
may be.  Within our context, we find that the magnitude of the congruence of economic orientation had a stronger 
effect on trust than the congruence of social orientation.  This suggests that it may be relatively less important 
whether the trustor has high or low social or economic orientation.  Trust may be driven more by whether both the 
trustor and trusted are high or low on either one of the two orientations.  In other words, trust is perhaps driven by a 
match of orientation between the trustor and the trusted rather than necessarily by high or low levels of orientation.  
 
However, we found that dyadic trust was not characterized by reciprocity in that a high level of trust by a 
trustor on a trusted did not necessarily result in a high level of trust when the roles were reversed.  Nevertheless, we 
found that in our data, higher order dependencies did influence the level of trust between a trustor and trusted.  We 
specifically found evidence in support of the common trustor effect in that a high level of trust by a third member on 
the actors in a dyad was correlated with a high level of trust within the dyad itself. Overall, our results suggest that a 
mere congruence of orientation within a trustor-trusted pair may not fully explain the level of trust between them 
because the latter is influenced by the context created by the fact that the dyad itself is embedded within a larger 
team.   
 
We do find that the teams were themselves distributed in the latent space and differed in the level of 
polarization in trust among its members.  Within each cluster, while some of the teams were more cohesive and 
characterized by similar levels of trust, others were less so and demonstrated greater variance in the levels of trust 
across team members.  In other words, the pattern of polarization ranged from balanced to highly polarized.  Not 
only are these patterns informative in and of themselves, they also provide support for our contention that higher 
order dependencies need to be examined and accounted for in the study of dyadic trust in teams.   
 
Taken together, our study findings suggest that, individual, dyadic, and systemic factors may influence trust 
between team members in an organizational setting.  While individual traits or personality characteristics, such as 
innate trustworthiness have been found to be important drivers of trust, we find that each of the two orientations 
considered in our research were themselves not significant drivers of trust.  However, the dyadic congruence or 
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match in the levels of orientation did affect trust.  Further, trust was characterized by higher order dependencies 
among team members. 
 
While our model and our study contribute to the literature on dyadic trust in teams, the work can be 
extended in several ways.  First, while we focused on economic and social orientation as the key individual level 
antecedents of trust, the model is flexible enough to accommodate the effects of other covariates and the congruence 
among them.  Second, we chose to conduct our empirical analysis in a setting where there was a high degree of 
homogeneity among the members of the teams, their overall goals, and the opportunities for them to develop social 
ties.  Future research should calibrate the model with more heterogeneous teams in order to complement our 
findings regarding the relative impact of the individual orientations, congruence, and higher order dependence.  
Finally, our study utilized a cross section of data and provides a snapshot of the drivers of trust at a point in time.  
However, the approach can be extended to longitudinal analyses to improve our understanding of the evolution of 
trust in teams. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The three steps for model estimation, as suggested by Hoff (2005), are as follows: 
 
1. Sampling of linear effects in the model: 
 
(a) Sample βd , tor, ted| βtor , βted, Ʃab, Ʃγ, Z, θ,  
 
(b) Sample βtor , βted| tor, ted, Ʃab, Ʃγ, Z, θ, 
 
(c) Sample Ʃab, Ʃγ  from their full conditionals 
 
2. Sampling of bilinear effects: 
 
(a) For each bidder i = 1, 2 . . . n, sample zi | {zj: j ≠ i}, θ, β, tor, ted, Ʃz, Ʃγ 
 
(b)  Sample Ʃz  from its full conditional distribution. 
  
3. Update { θ i,j, θ j,i} using Metropolis-Hastings step:  
 
(a) Propose  
*
,,
*
,,
~ ,
i j i j i ji j
j i j i j ij i
x a b z z
N
x a b z z 
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(b) Accept  
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i j
j i
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 
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The prior distributions of the parameters are taken as: 
 
 βd , tor, ted, βtor , βted, Z are considered as multivariate normal. 
 
 ƩAB  inverse Wishart Distribution  
 
 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
( )
, ~ iid inverse gamma(1,1), ,
4 ( )
a b a b
tor ted
a b

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